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Symposium
Conservative and Libertarian Reactions to the
Obama Administration

OBAMA'S CONSTITUTION: THE PASSIVE
VIRTUES WRIT LARGE
Richard A. Epstein*
THE FADING OBAMA MYSTIQUE
There is little doubt today about Barack Obama's political
orientation. He is a man of the Left. Yet in the fall of 2008,
during the height of the Presidential Election, there were endless
debates as to whether Obama counted as a political moderate
who understood that it was necessary to govern from the center
or whether he a strong left-of-center politician who had
mastered the lesson that radical politicians had to present
themselves in a way that went against type. The standard
political economy story that had some currency at the time was
that he would turn out to be a moderate on the grounds that all
presidential nominees move to court the median voter. That
impression was reinforced by his choice of advisors, many of
whom like Lawrence Summers, were retooled Clintonites who
were thought to be on the conservative wing of the Democratic
Party. And most powerfully, that image was reinforced by his
evident rhetorical elegance, his nice blue ties and his calm
demeanor. Taken together, his presentation of self was an
effective means to disarm those critics who insisted that his
politics put him, as his voting record suggested, to the left of
center of the American legal system.
It is this studied ambiguity that makes Obama so hard to
read. It is instructive that in the fall of 2008 many people asked
whether Obama counted as a socialist-a question that needed
(and still needs) a nuanced answer. Obama did not, and does not
*
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believe, in the government ownership over the means of
production. What he believes in is the extensive regulation by
government of the private firms that are responsible for
production. which may be achieved by any and all methods that
are available to a President and the Congress: taxes, mandates.
regulations. subsidies. The hard question is just how far he is
prepared to push on these levers of government power. WelL
that debate is over. As one centrist democrat put it to me,
ruefully, "we were both wrong. Obama is surely to the left of
where I thought he would be. But then again he is to the left of
where you thought he would be as well." I am not quite sure that
the last half of this observation is true. but without question he
has sought to move the ratio of public to private expenditures
and influence harder and faster on more issues than any
president in recent years. He is in favor of market liberalization
on issues like medical marijuana and stem cell research, but
otherwise his mindset is quite clear. The defects that we have in
the current situation all stem from too little government
regulation not from too much. He sees the health care system as
one in which private insurance markets have failed; the global
warming issue as one in which massive restrictions on emissions
are needed; the labor markets as suffering from declining real
income because of a want of effective union organization;
financial markets as failing because of greedy bankers and weak
and divided oversight. And so on down the line.
Sadly his rhetoric has become more strident and less
coherent since the Democratic Party lost the Senate seat in
Massachusetts. in what counts as one of the most stunning
reversals in political fortune ever in the United States. Rather
than mend his ways, bashing the banks has become the current
fixation. in the hope that the antagonism toward Wall Street will
allow him to pick up Republican support for showing that he is
made of sterner stuff, even if that means saddling the banks with
a set of punitive regulations and taxes. which will only further set
back the economy.
But, it will be asked, how deep are his convictions? On this
point. the issue is complicated to say the least. It is common
knowledge today that Obama now faces deep resentment from
the left-wing of the Democratic Party that is, if anything, further
to the left than he is. The issue. which at one time was confined
to blogs on the Left, has now become grist for the mainstream
press. To many of these people he is an ineffective compromiser,
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under the unprincipled spell of Rahm EmanueL who does not
see the imperative need to take over the healthcare system root
and branch and, for all I know. nationalize the banks as well.
Obama 's realist side makes one appreciate just how difficult it is
to govern from the center. when the dispersion of political
sentiment in the nation are greater than they have ever been. My
own sense is that Obama does not disagree in principle with
these critiques, but senses. however vaguely. that he cannot
possibly win reelection if he caters to exclusively his own
political base. So his strategy has been to engage in a go-slow
attitude that seeks to buy off some of his major opponents-the
pharmaceutical industry, the insurance industry-with welltimed, but inelegant compromises. For the purists in his party,
that willingness of compromise with the devil counts as a form of
political treason. For a working politician. it counts as first step
in political survival.
Yet note that this is a debate about tactics, and not about
principles. There is a question of whether Obama has any
principles. To the response that he does not, I can only say that I
think that his political instincts are deep, and are consistent with
the arc of his life. The origins of his belief system date back long
before he took up golf. His views I think were formed during his
college and law school years. They were strengthened by his
years in Chicago, where Obama never worked in any trade or
business, but was always a political organizer who learned to
form, when appropriate, alliances with business figures. His stint
at the University of Chicago Law School only strengthened his
earlier tendencies. Obama taught one portion of constitutional
law (race, due process and equal protection) for many years. His
teaching was effective, but left no intellectual footprint, for he
had none to leave. Indeed, there is little evidence from the
twelve or so years that we overlapped at the University of
Chicago that he thought hard about the current issues of health,
environment, labor and financial legislation that are the
centerpieces of his legislative program. Certainly, he had little or
no engagement with either conservative of libertarian thought
during his years as a senior lecturer. Then, as now. he was more
comfortable in the company of allies than critics.
I do not regard this as a new revelation. During his
successful campaign, I spoke out against the conventional
wisdom and questioned as well Hyde Park's adoration of its
most prominent first citizen. I took the position. based on a
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combination of personal knowledge and public pronouncements,
that Obama was a man of the Left who said what he meant, and
after a fashion meant what he had said. One of my reasons was
so simple that even a cynic could approve. With evident
trepidation, I read the Platform for the Democratic Party in
2008, "Renewing America's Promise" 1 and concluded that it
showed not the slightest awareness that some principled
limitations had to be placed on the government's power to tax
and to regulate. Its constant calls for instant action -Affordable
Health Care for All Americans-were to my mind not just
campaign rhetoric. They contained the seeds of the destruction
that eventually resulted in the shipwreck of the Democratic
healthcare reform efforts. It is not possible to increase access
and control costs at the same time-this platform gave a
powerful indication of the extent to which Obama had departed
from the moderately centrist strategy that Bill Clinton took on,
at least after the Republicans gained control of the Congress in
1994. There are no such corrections in the offing here.
FROM POLITICAL MYSTIQUE TO JUDICIAL
NOMINATIONS
The strong emphasis of legislative transformation shows in
his attitude toward the federal courts. The big story about the
Obama administration on the legal front is how little it seems to
care about the judicial nominations or the judicial process in
general. His rate of nominations has been slow and the rate of
conformations has been even slower. As Jonathan Adler has
2
noted in his blog on the Volokh Conspiracy, the explanation
could be that judicial nominations are pushed to the rear
because of the other major items on the agenda. In the
alternative, there are process explanations. One possibility is
that Obama-who has shown no distaste for executive powerhas centralized too much of the process in the White House, has
engaged in a vetting process that drives away competent people
from the White House, or has been overwhelmed by resistance
in the Senate, including individual holds on particular nominees.

1. See http://www.democrats.org/a/party/platform.html.
2. Jonathan Adler, Where Are Obama's Judicial Nominees?. October 18. 2009.
available at file:///Documents/ Articles/Obama %20and %20the %20Constitutionl ADler%
20on% 20nonminations. webarchi ve.
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Obama did. of course. preside over a full-court press to
appoint then-judge Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court. The
opposition to her from the Republican side talked in part about
her extracurricular work for La Raza and other Latino and
Latina groups. Most of that criticism did not amount to a hill of
beans if only because pointless claims of that sort are common in
conference settings. Indeed. the best line of her mostly drab
confirmation hearings was her bittersweet observation that her
invocation of a "wise Latina woman" did not go down well even
before a sympathetic audience, which is probably all for the
better.
What matters more was her view on judicial behavior. It
was quite clear that during the hearing she did not voice any
radical views on her future role on the bench. Instead, she
contented herself with saying that judges interpret and do not
make laws. and she would be bound by the legal tradition of
which she is a part. To the left this was an implicit rejection of
the "living constitution." To the right it was belated recognition
that its brand of originalism deserved greater respect than it
received. Yet working at this level of generality tells us very
little. In the few decisions of late, she has sided with the liberal
bloc, most notably in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission.' Prior to her elevation to the Supreme Court much
of her work was regarded as solid and sensible by most
observers. Indeed, she was (rightly) castigated for her views on
two key cases. only one of which reached the Supreme Court.
These two decisions may give some hint as to her future
performance on the Supreme Court.
The first of these was Didden v. Village of Port Chester.~
which took an astonishingly casual view, even by the lax
standards of Kelo v. City of New London,' toward the public use
limitation found in the takings clause to the Constitution. Kelo
was notorious insofar as it sanctioned a taking of private
property for redevelopment by another private party solely for
purposes of economic development. The proposed New London
plan was an economic farce from the outset, and the land still
stands vacant over four and one-half years after the decision
came down. But bad as Keto was on the textual foundation it

3.

130 S. Ct. X76 (2010).

4.
5.

173 Fed. Appx. 931 (2d Cir. 2006).
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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was not wholly unprincipled. It rested on the assumption that
there was an outer limit to the public use test that prohibited any
outright transfer from A to B that was not sanctioned by
extensive and inclusive public hearings and deliberation. When
the political process was working, the political blessing provided
an appropriate answer to the public use question that survived
judicial review.
In contrast Didden involved no public hearings or
deliberations. The Town of Port Chester had placed one Greg
Wasser in charge of new development for the entire town, and
he unilaterally informed Didden that he would condemn the
property for his own use unless the independent developer gave
him a large cash payment or a piece of the project for free. There
was no public process at all, except for a decision of the Village
to rubber stamp Wasser's request. What was needed was some
serious discussion of the limits of Kelo. What was given was a per
curiam opinion. which Sotomayor joined, that was so cursory it
was hard to believe that she took the matter seriously at all.
Her second major gaffe involved affirmative action where,
in another per curiam opinion in Ricci v. deStefano, 6 she
essentially gave the New Haven local government carte blanche
to disregard the elaborate system put in place to deal with the
promotion of firefighters on the ground that it could have
contained some measure of bias, given the disproportionate
outcomes on the standardized tests. Her decision was overturned
by the usual five-four conservative-liberal split, but what was
most instructive was that even the decision of the four dissenters,
led by Justice Ginsburg, would have required that New Haven
make out some good faith or for-cause showing as to why it
disregarded the results of the tests; this was more restrictive than
Sotomayor's decision, which gave New Haven a free pass on the
7
question.
To these two cases, it is possible to add a third high profile
case. Maloney v Cuomo,x which skirted the question of whether
the Second Amendment protection of the right to bear and keep
arms bound the states. Maloney never addressed incorporation
but rested on a reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, but applied a rational basis test to
6.

7.
8.

129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
!d.
554 F.3d 556 (2d Cir 2009).

2010]

OBAMA'S CONSTITUTION

189

the issue, and found the statute, banning the use of nunchukos,
constitutional. Maloney was decided after the Supreme Court's
9
game-changing decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, which
contained explicit language by Justice Scalia that required the
District to meet something more than the rational basis test in
10
order to sustain the statute. But Maloney regarded the matter
as one for rational basis analysis under the privileges or
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is, I
11
think, the one position that is clearly wrong.
There is a common thread that runs through these three
decisions. All of them adopted the hands-off rational basis point
perspective to the occult art of constitutional interpretation.
That is precisely what Obama wants in a Supreme Court Justice.
The essence of rational basis interpretation lies in its strong
presumptive acceptance of the legislative will, which is
disregarded only when no conceivable rationale for the decision
may be advanced. Complex legislation always involves difficult
tradeoffs, so that it is hard to find anything that passes that is so
conspicuously depraved that nothing can be said on its behalf,
especially by the interest group that championed its adoption. If
the standard is that the statute or executive action should pass
muster if it generates some discrete benefit to some group of
individuals, regardless of costs to others, the game is over.
Here's why. No statute will gain passage if it leaves
everyone worse off. So long as it is possible to dress up the
legislation with some fancy rationale, it will pass. Or to put it
otherwise, there has long been some talk that mere "naked
preferences" show a "raw" form of political power that requires
12
them to be struck down. But it is easy to dress up preferences
by showing that some group of individuals is given release
against rising prices, or is it, falling prices, or is it price
stagnation? No matter, there is always some evil to combat.
Given this frame of mind, the standard of review becomes
so overpowering that the substantive issue scarcely matters. The
three Sotomayor cases just mentioned deal with issues that could
not be further apart: property rights, affirmative action, and
9. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
10. Heller 128 S. Ct .. at 2817n.27.
11. See Richard A. Epstein. Does the Second Amendment Bind Frank
Easterbrook?. 77 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
12. See. Cass R. Sunstein. ,'Vaked Preferences and the Constillltion. 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1689 (1984).
.
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guns. But the rational basis test flattens the substantive issues; it
ignores the textual differences; and it turns substantive
differences into mere details in the grand scheme of things. The
rational basis test inverts the original design of the Constitution.
No longer is government to be regarded as a necessary evil with
limited powers. It is to be regarded as a welcome manifestation
of the popular will. The duty of judges may not be to celebrate
these statutes, although they often do. But it is at the very least
to defer to the outcomes of the political branches, not to resist
them.
It is worth noting, moreover, that this orientation is not
unique to Democrats. Republicans take the same attitude when
it comes to state intervention on issues of personal liberty to
which Democrats (rightly) take a small government attitude,
such as the use of medical marijuana, which provoked yet
13
another strong pro government decision in Gonzales v. Raich.
The Obama administration may dislike this decision on the
merits, but it need not play any constitutional trump card. It can
simply announce that it will respect the right of any state to
administer its own medical marijuana law. The substantive
approach of the two parties is far apart, but at least on the
constitutional issues, the Democratic Party has few desires to
advance its own political agenda through constitutional
litigation, even if it has no desire to back down on cases such as
Roe v. Wade, which set the agenda 36 years ago.
Against this background, it is clear how the Sotomayor
appointment and her jurisprudence fit with the Obama game
plan for the courts. She is willing to cut him a lot of slack in the
political space. It is equally clear that he was not troubled by the
fact that her background also contains clear conservative
elements. Her litigation experience in private practice centered
on commercial law and intellectual property. It remains to be
seen whether this will influence how she thinks about these
questions. Her public service was in the prosecutor's office. Her
life story speaks of a woman who made a personal odyssey that
started in the projects, went from Princeton to Yale, to the
corridors of power. But the constitutional attitude of deference
on all new initiatives that come within her purview is consistent
with the larger Obama approach. His ambitious agenda depends
on judges who are prepared to stand off to one side, by rejecting
13.

545

u.s. 1 (2005).
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all the arguments raised against his government programs, many
of which rely on unprecedented levels of government coercion.
And those attacks will come on both grounds of federalism
and individual rights. Some of these attacks will be odd to say
the least. Before the legislation cratered, there were many
efforts to announce that national healthcare legislation is
unconstitutional on the grounds that physician-patient relations
are local matters that are outside the reach of the Commerce
Clause. The argument was that individual autonomy was
overridden by this new intrusion of the federal government. I
disliked the earlier healthcare bill as much anyone but thought
that the strongest constitutional argument against it was that it
treated the private insurers as regulated public utilities who, at
the end of the day, could not earn a sufficient rate of return to
14
remain in business. But the Commerce Clause argument
mistakenly cast the autonomy issue as a federalism issue when it
is in fact one about individual entitlements against government,
which should be as powerful against state action as against
federal action. Structured as a commerce clause argument it will
not, and, under current law, should not win a single vote at any
level of the judicial system.
The coercive nature of the current legislative program does
mean, however, that the attacks on the Obama program based
on individual rights could stand an outside chance of success.
The requirement that individuals take out insurance that works
against their own interest, or pay a tax if they choose not to,
raises the level of government coercion to new heights. There is
a respectable argument at least that this measure of coercion
represents a denial of liberty or the loss of private property or
both. But so long as a rational basis test gives lots of running
room for political actors, it does not matter what theory is raised
against a new major program. Program survives, attack fails: end
of story.

14. See Impermissible Ra!emaking in Health-Insurance Reform: Why the Reid Bill
is UnconsTitutional, Medical Progress Today (Manhattan Institute) http://www.
medicalprogresstoday.com/enewslet ters/mpt_ind. php?pid= 1834&nid=250
and
at Point of Law.com. http://www.pointoflaw.com/columns/archives/2009/12/
impermissible-ratemaking-in-he.php. For the shorter version. see Richard A.
Epstein. Harry Reid Turns Insurance Into a Public Utility. available at
h ttp://online. wsj .com/ article/SB I 0001424052 74870430450457 4610040924143158.
html 0 mod=rss_opinion_main.
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The same could, and should, be said of another piece of
dormant legislation, the Employee Free Choice Act, whose
major provisions allow for card check to displace union
elections, and forces the employer into a binding two-year
"contract," without judicial review from an arbitral panel
appointed by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Board
housed in the Obama Department of Labor. 15 The coercive
power of the state is nightmarish in its implication if it can force
people to enter into losing transactions. But once again, the
rational basis might well be made to work its magic in these
contexts, precisely because it is not bound by any traditional
coinception of individual justice. Recall, for example, that we
have on the books many examples of government power that
offends the usual principles of justice, including retroactive taxes
16
that look like takings as well. But there is an upward fight on
this issue because the Supreme Court has said on more than one
occasion that an appeal to settled expectations has no traction as
a constitutional principle. Today there is an increasing disquiet
in conservative circles about the unbounded possibilities of
coercive legislation. More to the point, there is a willingness on
the part of some judges to make creative judicial arguments to
escape from past precedent.
One recent decision in this vein is Guggenheim v. City of
Goleta, 17 where the question was whether Goleta's rent
stabilization law ran afoul of the takings clause. Like all rent
stabilization statutes, Goleta used a formula that set the rent at
which mobile home owners could occupy for their exclusive
benefit land owned by other individuals. As is the case with all
rent control statutes, the owner of the "pad" could not evict a
tenant at the expiration of the lease, but was required to renew
the lease on disadvantageous terms, except in a few cases where
termination was for cause, e.g. nonpayment of rent. Worse still,
the owner who sold the pad could sell along with it the right to
remain on the premise. The net effect is that the sale price for
the RV embedded the future discounted value for the pad.

15. For mv discussion. see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN. THE CASE AGAINST THE
btPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT 157-74 (2009).
16. See, e.g.. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
17. 582 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2009). For my extended comments. see Richard A.
Epstein. Takings Law Made Hard. REGULATION 4 (Winter 2009-2010), available at
http://www .cato.org/pubs/regulation!re gv32n4/v32n4-1. pdf.
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When Justice O'Connor was faced with a physical takings
1
challenge on this arrangement in Yee v. City of Escondido. ' she
reached the incredible conclusion that there was no physical
taking because the landowner had let the mobile home owner
onto the property. Permit entry for a year and it is as if you have
allowed entry for an indefinite term. ~ The pad owner in that case
did not press the regulatory takings issue, so once the physical
taking claim was rebuffed the case was at an end. Undeterred.
Jay Bybee in the Ninth Circuit cut through the doctrinal thicket
that came his way, and held that the entire statute was amenable
to a facial challenge because it operated as a per se regulatory
taking. It was only fitting irony that it cited the Sunstein article.
noted above, that spoke about naked preferences in support of a
conclusion that cut pretty much in the opposite direction.
There is a sobering lesson here. The same types of judicial
machinations that have long been used on behalf of liberal
causes are available to conservative judges as well. The Obama
administration wants and needs judges who will not be party to
those maneuvers. But otherwise it has little to gain from seeking
judges who think that it is their job to move the ball forward.
That is not true, however, for the conservatives who fear liberal
judges in part because they will not reverse the current
constitutional status quo. Needless to say, these same
conservatives also fear liberal judges for their potential decisions
in a raft of mid level statutory and common law claims that do
not go to ultimate constitutional issues that impact the Obama
agenda. Obama clearly cares about these second level issues. as
well he should, but for him the key question is how high they
stand on the overall agenda. With the debacle of the health care
bill and the renewed emphasis of job creation. we know the
answer to that question: not as high as his big ticket items on the
legislative front. So in a world of limited resources. and in his
case, diminished political capital, nominations for appeals court
and district court take a back seat. The powder is. I suspect.
being kept dry for the nomination of a replacement for Justice
Stevens, Justice Ginsburg or both. But the twists and turns in
particular cases should be allowed to obscure the basic point that
on high-stakes constitutional issue, Obama wants judges who
preserve the status quo. not those with a sense of intellectual
1

18.
19.

503 U.S. 519 (1992).
/d. at 529-30.
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adventure and excitement. For this he needs a cooperative
Supreme Court. If that court is to have any bold spirit, it will be
to overrule decisions that place a crimp in the power of the
federal government to do as it will. United States v. Lopei0 is an
obvious target on the Commerce Clause. even though it has
been completely contained by subsequent Supreme Court and
lower court opinions. What he must hope for is the surprise
resignation of a conservative justice, which would lead surely
allow a liberal appointment that could undo what little remains
of Lopez. An old Chinese curse says "May you live in interesting
times." Court lovers and court haters always find themselves in
that unenviable position.

20.

516 U.S. 549 (1995).

